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Disorder in the Court:
Physician-Assisted Suicide and
the Constitution
Robert A. Burt*
Justice Robert Jackson once described a Supreme Court
decision, from which he was dissenting, as "more interesting to
students of psychology and of the judicial processes than to
students of constitutional law."' His observation might equally
apply to the Court's recent rulings about physician-assisted
suicide.2 Whatever their explanation-psychologically or jurisprudentially-the Justices' conduct in this matter was surely
unusual.
On the surface, the Court's action might appear straightforward. The Justices voted unanimously to reverse the Second
and Ninth Circuit decisions that had overturned, on differing
constitutional grounds, state laws prohibiting physicianassisted suicide for terminally ill patients.' The circuit court
decisions had seemed, to me, at least, as extraordinarily abrupt
and even reckless invocations of judicial authority, if only because
there was no practical experience anywhere in this country to
gauge the impact of legalized physician-assisted suicide but
there were many reasons to believe that this practice would
fundamentally and harmfully transform medical and social
treatment of people with serious illnesses.4 In adjudicating the
existence of constitutional rights, courts are of course not
obliged to follow election returns; but though we can find examples ofjudicial boldness in striking down popular legislative
enactments, the Supreme Court had never in its history consti* Alexander 1VL Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 325 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill,
117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
3. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en bane); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
4. See Robert A. Burt, ConstitutionalizingPhysician-Assisted Suicide:
Will Lightning Strike Thrice?, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 159 (1996).
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tutionally imposed a rule on all states where no state had ever
implemented such a rule. When the Court had overturned
state abortion laws' or death penalty laws' or race segregation
laws7 or minimum wage laws,8 there were considerable numbers
of states that had already adopted these results;9 but not so for
physician-assisted suicide, which had been legally recognized
only in Oregon in a 1994 popular referendum, and even this
law had not yet been put into actual effect. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court's unanimous reversal of the circuit courts' rulings
could be seen as a sober reassertion of the traditional judicial
caution that has usually been the framework for constitutional
adjudication.
There were, however, many oddities about this Supreme
Court ruling that belie its apparent sobriety and suggest that
the Court's apparent rejection of a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide is not as firmly grounded as the Justices' unanimous vote might appear. There is, one might say,
less than meets the eye in this unanimous result.
Consider, first of all, Chief Justice William Rehnquist's
opinions, denominated as "the opinions of the Court."'° For almost their entirety, these two opinions adopt the narrow, unambitious approach to constitutional adjudication that has
been the particular hallmark of Rehnquist's jurisprudence.
The Ninth Circuit's finding of a "liberty-based" or implicitly
"privacy-based" constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide is wrong, Rehnquist opined, because there is neither explicit textual support nor historical support in actual predominant state practice for such a right." As for the Second
Circuit's ruling that New York law cannot rationally distinguish
between its approval of patient choice in refusing lifeprolonging medical treatment and its prohibition of patient
choice for medical treatment that would hasten death,
Rehnquist essentially concluded that the distinction is rational
enough for constitutional purposes because lots of people think

5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
9. See Burt, supra note 4, at 159-62.
10. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill,
117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
11. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261-75.
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it's rational.'2 In both cases, Rehnquist invoked his bootstrapping version of constitutional adjudication: the best (and perhaps even the only necessary) evidence for the constitutional
validity of a state law is its existence. No novelty here-until,
however, the final footnote in each of his two opinions.
At the end of his opinion in the Ninth Circuit case,
Rehnquist quoted Justice Stevens' observation in his concurring
opinion that he "would not 'foreclose the possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor
whose assistance was sought, could prevail in a more particularized challenge.'" 3 Rehnquist then continued, "Our opinion
does not absolutely foreclose such a claim. However, given our
holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not provide heightened protection to the asserted liberty interest in ending one's life with a physician's
assistance, such a claim would have to be quite different from
the ones advanced by respondents here."4 Similarly, at the
end of his opinion in the Second Circuit case, Rehnquist again
quoted Stevens: "Justice Stevens observes that our holding today 'does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of
the New York statute may impose an intolerable intrusion on
the patient's freedom'"; and Rehnquist again added, 'This is
true, but.., a particular plaintiff hoping to show that New
York's assisted-suicide ban was unconstitutional in his particular case would need to present different and considerably
stronger arguments than those advanced by respondents
here."'
What different arguments, what stronger arguments
might Rehnquist have had in mind in these two footnotes? The
plaintiffs in the two cases, by all appearances, tossed in every
plausible constitutional claim they could imagine to overturn
the state bans. If the Chief Justice really did mean that his
opinion, on behalf of the Court, did not foreclose some future
constitutional challenge to these laws, it was at the least ungenerous of him to withhold any guidance for future plaintiffs. Socraticstyle law teachers often "hide the ball" from their students, but
this kind of teasing pedagogy is hardly typical for judicial
opinions. The most plausible explanation for Rehnquistfs failure

12.
13.
14.
15.

See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2296-2302.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 n.24 (citation omitted).
Id.
Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2302 n.13 (citations omitted).
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to offer even a hint about the specific content of the "different
and considerably stronger" constitutional arguments is that, in
the light of his sweeping dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims in
the pending cases, he could not imagine what those arguments
might be.
Why, then, did Rehnquist's opinions end with these teasing but apparently empty footnotes? The most plausible explanation appears to be in the realm of judicial politics; these
footnotes have the markings of a price paid by Rehnquist to attract enough votes to convert his opinions into the "opinions of
the Court." Though the Court was unanimous in rejecting the
constitutional challenges, only five Justices joined Rehnquist's
opinions; and one of those five, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
also wrote a separate concurring opinion which strongly suggested that Rehnquist's final footnotes were aimed toward
her.'6 O'Connor drew a distinction in her separate opinion that
Rehnquist did not explicitly address; she distinguished between "facial challenges" to the state prohibitions on assisted
suicide and a "narrower question whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of
his or her imminent death." O'Connor claimed that there was
"no need to address" this narrower question because "the parties
and amici agree that in these [two defendant] States a patient
who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication,
from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to
the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death."7
O'Connor accordingly stated that she joined Rehnquist's opinion because it rejected a "generalized right to 'commit suicide,'
but did not and did not "need to address" the more particularized constitutional claim of a terminally ill, unrelievedly suffering
person.'8
This is a very odd construction of the issues raised in the
two cases. What was all the fuss about, one might ask, if
O'Connor was correct that all of the parties and amici agreed
that physicians faced no legal barriers in providing medication
to hasten death for suffering, terminally ill patients? There
was in fact no such agreement among the parties and amici;

16. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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there could not be because Justice O'Connor was simply wrong
in her assertion about the absence of legal barriers. They exist
in at least two contexts. First, there are sharp restrictions on
the availability of narcotics in both federal and state laws
which are aimed at controlling street drug uses but have the
practical consequence of impeding physicians' ability to provide
drugs to their suffering patients. These impediments affect not
simply drug dosages that might carry some risk of hastened
death for patients but more generally obstruct physicians'
ability to prescribe safe and effective medications to control
pain. 9 Second, in circumstances where there is some foreseeably heightened risk of death from pain-relieving narcotics
provision, it is true that no state or federal law directly prohibits such provision-but only if the physician's sole intent is to
relieve pain. If it could be proven that the prescribing physician's "true" intent was to hasten death or even if her intention
was "mixed" in wishing for both pain relief and hastened
death, then this legal exemption would, as a formal matter, not
apply.' There is an Alice-in-Wonderland quality about this
kind of legalistic reasoning: when an intensely suffering patient appears close to death, and his physician is inclined to increase narcotics dosages with clear knowledge that this increase is likely to hasten death, how can the physician or
anyone else be confident that her motive is only singlemindedly intended to relieve pain? And if the physician fears
prosecution or adverse publicity of any sort, even if this fear is
wholly unrealistic, the physician's knowledge of her own mixed
motives or her anticipation that if challenged she could not
prove the "purity" of her pain-relieving motives to others
clearly would act as an inhibition. The narrowness of existing
legal permission to prescribe pain-relieving narcotics thus
surely amounts--contrary to Justice O'Connor's assertion-to
a "legal barrier[] to obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point of causing
unconsciousness and hastening death."2'
19. See COWmrrEE ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE 190-

98 (Marilyn J. Field & Christine K. Cassel eds., 1997); Sandra Johnson, DisciplinaryActs and PainRelief-Analysis of the PainRelief Act, 24 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 319 (1996).
20. See Howard Brody, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Courts: Moral
Equivalence,Double Effect, and ClinicalPractice,82 MINN. L. REV. 939 (1998)

[this Symposium].
21

Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303.
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Justice O'Connor did not acknowledge the fictitious basis
for her concurrence in the Court's opinions. But another Justice, in a separate concurring opinion, was almost explicit in
identifying this falsehood as such-and yet he also relied on
this falsehood as the basis for his willingness to uphold the
constitutionality of state laws prohibiting physician-assisted
suicide.' Justice Stephen Breyer agreed with O'Connor that
the Court was not required to adjudicate the existence of a constitutional right to assisted suicide on the ground that "the
avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with death) would
have to comprise an essential part" of any claimed constitutional right and that "the laws before us do not force a dying
person to undergo that kind of pain... [because] they do not
prohibit doctors from providing patients with drugs sufficient
to control pain despite the risk that those drugs themselves
will kill."' Unlike Justice O'Connor, however, Justice Breyer
did cite amicus briefs that pointed to inhibitions on physicians'
willingness to prescribe adequate pain-relieving drugs.' "We
are.., told," he said, "that there are many instances in which
patients do not receive the palliative care that, in principle, is
available"; but, he continued, "that is so for institutional reasons or inadequacies or obstacles, which would seem possible
to overcome, and which do not include a prohibitive set of
laws."2"
There is an old saw among litigators that if the law is
against you, argue the facts; if the facts are against you, argue
the law; and if the law and the facts are against you, pound the
table. Justice Breyer's resort to italicized expression strikes
me as a table-pounding maneuver. At the very end of his concurring opinion, moreover, Breyer came close to admitting the
shakiness of his assertion:
Were the legal circumstances different-for example, were state law
to prevent the provision of palliative care, including the administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life-then the law's
impact upon serious and otherwise unavoidable physical pain
(accompanying death) would be more directly at issue. And as Justice O'Connor suggests, the Court might have to revisit its conclusions in these cases. '

22.
23.
24-.
25.
26.

See id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2311.
See id.
Id. at 2312.
Id.
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Justice Breyer thus provided a clear road-map for future
litigative challenge to state laws banning assisted suicide-a
mapping that Chief Justice Rehnquist had withheld in his delphically obscure final footnotes and that Justice O'Connor did
not admit in her concurring opinion that gave Rehnquist his
fifth vote to constitute an opinion for the Court. Breyer was,
moreover, virtually transparent in acknowledging the unsetthing implications of his road-map.
He joined Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion "except insofar as it joins the
majority" and he pointedly observed that O'Connor's "views,
which I share, have greater legal significance than the Court's
opinion suggests."27
Three other Justices concurred in the result but not in the
Court's opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg seemed to follow
Breyer's path, though without his explicit transparency. She
simply said, "I concur in the Court's judgments in these cases
substantially for the reasons stated by Justice O'Connor in her
concurring opinion."' Justice John Paul Stevens filed an extended concurring opinion which in many ways was the most
puzzling of all the opinions in the case. Stevens was openly
explicit in concluding that individuals' interest in hastening
their death "is entitled to constitutional protection."29 Stevens
devoted almost all of his opinion to refuting the arguments
against the existence of such a constitutional right; but he
chose to construe the plaintiffs' claims as nothing more than
"facial challenges" to the state statutes which he was unwilling
to endorse as such. Stevens thus ignored the existence of specific named plaintiffs in the case who had given vivid details of
their dying, their unrelieved physical and emotional pain, their
explicit wishes to hasten death and the inhibitory impact on
those wishes of the state laws prohibiting physician-assisted
suicide. In overturning the Washington state law, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had explicitly denied that it was addressing the "facial validity" of the challenged state act, 0 and
though all of the originally named plaintiffs had died by the
time the case reached the Supreme Court, this-like constitutional challenges to abortion laws where the specific plaintiffs
claim for an abortion has been mooted before appellate adjudi27. Id. at 2310.
28. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 2305 (Stevens, J., concurring).
30. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 797-98 (9th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
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cation 3'-is not an adequate reason for an appellate court to ignore their claims against the specific applications of a state law
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. The very circumstances
that Justice Stevens described in his concurring opinion as
justifying a constitutional right to hastened death were in fact
presented in the pleadings of one or another of the specific
named plaintiffs in the two cases. If Justices O'Connor,
Breyer, and Ginsburg refused to overturn state laws by misconstruing or even falsifying their actual inhibitory effects on
physician conduct, it appears that Justice Stevens followed a
similar course by misreading plaintiffs' specific claims about
the inhibitory effects on their conduct. It is virtually impossible to understand from Stevens' opinion what more he would
have wanted from the plaintiffs in the two cases in order to
proclaim the existence of a constitutional right that he appeared to endorse.
Justice David Souter also filed a lengthy concurring opinion and, like Stevens, openly expressed a strong inclination to
find a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide but
nonetheless voted to uphold the state statutory prohibitions.32
Unlike Stevens, however, Souter did not conceal the reasons
for his hesitancy by invoking opaque pleading formalities.
Souter was quite clear that notwithstanding the strength he
saw in the constitutional principles supporting individual privacy and autonomy and the breach of those principles involved
in statutory prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide, he was
not yet prepared to endorse a constitutional right because
there were still too many uncertainties about the practical
applications and the social and individual costs involved in
implementing such a right. Souter's opinion was the most
straightforward of all-unlike Rehnquist who appeared obviously disingenuous in refusing to foreclose any future argument for a constitutional right, unlike O'Connor, Breyer and
Ginsburg who misrepresented the palliative measures for dying people permitted by existing state laws, unlike Stevens
who promised to find a constitutional right in some future
cases that seemed indistinguishable from the current cases.
Souter's honesty did, however, entail some cost; it was not
clear what jurisprudential principle he could offer to justify his
position. There was, moreover, one unusual aspect of Souter's

31. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 123-25 (1973).
32. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 (Souter, J., concurring).
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position that virtually begged for an explicit jurisprudential
justification. At the end of his opinion, Souter concluded that
"legislatures... have superior opportunities to obtain the facts
necessary for a judgment about the present controversy... [including] the power to experiment, moving forward
and pulling back as facts emerge within their own jurisdictions."3 But Souter was not prepared simply to defer to the
legislative process, as Rehnquist's opinion had done; Souter
appeared to conclude that legislatures had not simply an opportunity but, more importantly, an obligation to engage in serious, sustained factfinding so that the practical concerns
about recognizing a right to assisted suicide would either be
"confirmed or discredited."' He implied the existence of this
obligation with this statement: "I do not decide here what the
significance might be of legislative foot-dragging in ascertaining the facts going to the State's argument that the right in
question could not be confined as claimed."3 5
Souter did not, however, clearly specify the kind of investigative obligation he would impose on legislatures. He surely
did not mean that all state legislatures, or even a random few,
were obliged to enact legislation authorizing physician-assisted
suicide so that its merits could be "confirmed or discredited";
given his refusal to endorse a constitutional right to physicianassisted suicide, he could not require any legislature to approve it, even on an "experimental" basis. What then did he
mean by "legislativefoot-dragging"? The short answer is that
he was not clear-and perhaps even purposefully unclear.
Immediately following this vaguely stated obligation, however,
he was willing to issue a somewhat less vaguely stated threat:
"Sometimes a court may be bound to act regardless of the institutional preferability of the political branches as forums for
addressing constitutional claims. See, e.g., Boling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954)." 3'
This is an intriguing citation. Bolling was, of course, the
companion case to Brown v. Board of Education37 regarding
segregation in the District of Columbia schools; Souter's linkage between Bolling and "legislative foot-dragging" appears to

33. Id. at 2293.

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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be a reference not simply to the Southern states' failure to
eradicate school segregation before they were constitutionally
required to do so 1954 but also to their massive resistance
thereafter. Regarding physician-assisted suicide, Souter appears to invoke not only Brown I but also Brown II and its indistinct injunction about "foot-dragging"-that is, its requirement that states must act "with all deliberate speed."38 To
paraphrase Souter's reasoning, he seems to be saying, "I see a
constitutional basis for requiring state approval of physicianassisted suicide, but I am troubled by the practical consequences of such a ruling; I am willing to defer for now, but not
forever, to legislatures so that they can have time to use their
superior investigative resources to 'confirm or discredit' the
substantiality of these practical concerns." This position is directly reminiscent of the Warren Court's endorsement in
Brown I of the constitutional claim but its refusal in Brown II,
because of practical concerns about implementation, to require
immediate enforcement of individual students' rights against
race segregation in public schools.
Brown I is not a popular decision these days. It is thus
not surprising that Souter would be reluctant to directly invoke
its precedential force. If, moreover, Brown I were literally his
guide, this would mean that Souter was prepared to give states
thirteen years but not a minute longer-the time lapse, that is,
between the Court's promulgation of the "deliberate speed"
formula in 1955 and its repudiation in 1968 39-- to investigate
and experiment regarding the problems raised by the prospect
of physician-assisted suicide in the treatment of dying people.
It seems unlikely that Souter would want to give such explicit
license to legislatures. He was, however, clearly looking for
some temporizing resolution, some jurisprudential formula
that would give impetus to a constitutional right to physicianassisted suicide but without imposing it, at least not immediately. I find much to commend in this course-not only as a
judicial response to the claims for constitutionalizing physicianassisted suicide, but more generally as a jurisprudential technique for promoting a sustained, focused, empirically informed,
and mutually respectful interchange between courts and legislatures about constitutional principle and practice.'

38. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
39. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
40. Regarding the constitutional claims for physician-assisted suicide, I
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It seems most plausible that this same temporizing impulse
lay behind the odd maneuverings of the other Justices who
concurred in the Court's disposition. Stevens explicitly invited
future litigation and Breyer was almost as explicit, in effect
inviting a constitutional challenge to state laws that do in fact
obstruct the provision of adequate pain palliation for terminally ill people.41 Even Chief Justice Rehnquist's final footnotes appeared to promise that the constitutional claims were
not foreclosed in perpetuity (though these assurances were so
much at odds with this rest of his reasoning as to appear disingenuous at best).
From the five concurring opinions in the two cases, it is
thus possible to compile a single attitude-a true opinion for
the Court, as it were-that the controversy about the existence
of a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide was not
yet ripe for definitive resolution but must await future developments in state legislatures and in repeated, particularized
litigation. Although it is possible to refract all of these opinions through this single lens, to view all of the concurrences as
if they reflected the calm rhetoric that Justice Souter displayed,
this measured reading would miss something dissonant that.
can be detected in all of these opinions, Souter's included.
There are odd, discordant notes in all of the Justices' opinions-the incoherence of Stevens' assertion that the statutes
were not challenged as applied and his correspondingly puzzling effort to present his dissent as a concurrence; the blatant
factual errors about legal barriers to pain palliation in
O'Connor's opinion, which Breyer virtually acknowledged as he
joined with her; the muffled, cryptic character of Ginsburg's
short concurrence "substantially" agreeing with O'Connor, but
not enough to join her opinion or follow her in joining
Rehnquist; the misleading designation of Rehnquist's opinion
as speaking for a Court majority though O'Connor's fifth vote
was significantly at odds with the other four; and even Souter's
indecipherable directives for future legislative actions. There
urged a similar course (though more clearly neutral toward any ultimate
holding for a right to assisted suicide) in an amicus curiae brief, arguing that
the controversy was not ripe for definitive constitutional resolution. See Brief
of the Project on Death in America, Open Society Institute, as Amicus Curiae,
for Reversal of the Judgments Below, Quill (No. 95-1858) & Glucksberg (No.
96-110). Regarding the general jurisprudence underlying this kind of approach, see ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992).

41. See Robert A.Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide

but a Constitutional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234
(1997).
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was, in short, something disordered about each of the Justices'
opinions-and something equally disordered about the isolation of each of them from one another, about their inability or
unwillingness to find a common approach or vocabulary.
This incoherence was demonstrated most graphically by
Chief Justice Rehnquist's appendage of his final footnotes
claiming that constitutional issues remained open notwithstanding the patent intent in the text of his opinion to close off
every conceivable constitutional claim. This contradiction was
only the most visible expression of the central difficulty evident
in all of the opinions-that the Justices could not bring themselves to resolve the issues but, with the signal exception of
Souter, they could not forthrightly admit their irresolution.
This reticence may simply have arisen from the Justices' conception of the conventional imperatives of the judicial role, that
judges are supposed to decide controversies and decisively so.
Or their reticence may reflect something more, something
about the underlying character of this controversy.
I believe there are especially disturbing elements in the
assisted suicide controversy that substantially explain the
oddities evident in the Justices' conduct. I come to this conclusion, in part, by reflecting on the close similarities between
the assisted suicide cases and the behavior of the Justices in
the death penalty cases beginning in the 1970s. Especially in
the initial death penalty cases, there is an erratic and almost
willfully incoherent quality to the Justices' conduct, which, I
believe, is best understood as a response to the emotional impact
of the subject-matter, to the disturbing quality of the confrontation with death. In the subsequent history of the death penalty jurisprudence, the Justices grapple with this disturbance
and come to terms with it in ways that offer some suggestive
predictions for the future developments in the jurisprudence of
assisted suicide.
One similarity between the current assisted suicide cases
and the early death penalty cases is apparent on the face of the
Court's dramatic decision in 1971 effectively overturning every
extant state capital punishment statute. In Furman v. Georgia,42 the Court arrayed itself in the same pattern as in the assisted suicide cases-with a bloc of four solidly opposed to
finding any constitutional problems in the state statutes and
five Justices comprising the majority, each of whom found
42. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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faults but could neither identify common ground among themselves nor provide a clearly coherent explanation for their own
individual positions. In one sense, Furmanhad more in common
with the circuit court rulings than the Supreme Court decision
in the assisted suicide cases-that is, in its utterly unexpected
and sweepingly ambitious scope. Furman itself is best described in the way that Justice Potter Stewart characterized
the death penalty, as being "struck by lightning"43 that appears
startlingly and unpredictably as if from nowhere; and this
would also characterize the rulings of the two courts of appeals-one en banc by an eight-to-three majority, the other by
a unanimous panel decision-invoking constitutional authority
to impose results at odds with long-established practice in essentially every state.' But notwithstanding the apparent sobriety of the Supreme Court's reversals of these rulings, there
is an equally unpredictable and startling quality to the oddities
I have identified in the Justices' opinions, a similar lighteninglike quality in their brief outbursts.
The important similarity between the death penalty and
assisted suicide cases is in their common subject-matter-not
simply death, but the claim that state law was responsible for
imposing deaths of terrible suffering and that the core injustice
was the irrationality and unfairness of the states' impositions.
The central litigative claim shared by the two sets of cases was
that courts should intervene to alleviate the suffering, to rationalize and thereby to tame the imposition of death. A quick
tour of the Supreme Court's tortuous response to this claim
since the 1970s will identify some possible parallels for future
responses to assisted suicide, some impulses that the Justices
may find equally hard to resist.
The Court's dramatic ruling in Furmanwas especially unexpected because it came just one year after the Court had decided, in McGautha v. California,4 that states were not constitutionally obliged to formulate rationalizing standards to guide
jury deliberation in death penalty cases and, indeed, that the
"infinite variety of cases and facets to each case"' rendered any
standardizing effort "beyond present human ability."47 Stitching

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See Burt, supra note 4, at 162.
402 U.S. 183 (1971).
Id. at 208.
Id. at 204.
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together the five separate opinions of the Justices in Furman
one year later, the majority seemed to conclude that capital
punishment was unconstitutional because it was applied unpredictably and thus without rational standards. Thirty-five
states quickly responded to this ruling by reenacting death
penalty statutes in various versions, and just four years later
the Supreme Court again abruptly reversed course, in Gregg v.
Georgia," ruling that some of these renewed statutes were sufficiently rationalized so as to solve whatever problems the majority had seen in Furman. In other words, in 1976 the Court
held that some states had accomplished what the Court had
found in 1971 to be "beyond present human ability." It might
seem between 1971 and 1976 that the Court had observed a
stunningly rapid evolutionary advance; or, more likely, during
this time a majority of the Justices had been ambivalent and
erratic in their approach to the death penalty.
Justice Thurgood Marshall identified one reason for this
inconstancy in his concurring opinion in Furman. As recently
as the preceding year in the conference deliberations on
McGautha, Marshall had held the view that capital punishment was not inherently unconstitutional;4 9 in Furman, however, he dramatically shifted ground to this absolutist position.
Explaining himself in Furman, Marshall stated, "Candor compels me to confess that I am not oblivious to the fact
that... [this case] [not only... involve[s] the lives of these
three petitioners, but those of the almost 600 other condemned
men and women in this country currently awaiting execution."
When Furman reached the Supreme Court a nationwide moratorium had been in effect since 1967, effectively pieced together
from the procedural rulings of several lower courts obtained by
abolitionist litigators challenging all aspects of the administration of the death penalty." By 1972, all of these various
challenges had been judicially rebuffed except for the lastditch, unprecedented and seemingly implausible claim that the
Court addressed in Furman, whether capital punishment was
inherently "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth

48. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
49. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the
DeathPenalty:A View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313, 317-18 (1986).
50. 408 U.S. 238,316 (Marshall, J., concurring).
5L See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUsuAL: THE SUPREME CoUiRT
AND CAPITAL PUNIsHMNT 107-09, 12648 (1973).
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Amendment.' Accordingly, as Marshall observed, the lives not
just of the three petitioners in Furman but 600 others immediately hung on the Justices' disposition; and Marshall was not
alone among the Justices in this realization.
The imminent prospect of death may, as Samuel Johnson
observed, "wonderfully concentrate" the mind;' but it does not
necessarily promote clear thinking. Though Justices Brennan
and Marshall never strayed during their remaining tenure on
the Court from the conclusion each expressed in Furman regarding the inherent unconstitutionality of capital punishment, two of the other majority Justices in Furman-Potter
Stewart and Byron White-virtually immediately reversed
themselves in Gregg.' White was ready to validate all of the
re-enacted death penalty statutes while Stewart only approved
of some; but the distinctions between any of these statutes and
those invalidated in Furmanwere difficult to discern."5
If we view the Court's jurisprudence on the death penalty
overall from 1971 until today, a clear logic becomes apparent:
the Court today has worked its way back to the position it took
in McGautha, that state administration of capital punishment
is essentially not subject to question on federal constitutional
grounds. The Court has travelled this circular route without,
however, acknowledging that it had overruled Furman in order
to return to McGautha; the Court instead has claimed that
states have succeeded in rationalizing the administration of
the death penalty while at the same time the Court has virtually eliminated, by various procedural maneuvers, the possibility
of federal court oversight to assure that rationality prevails in
any individual application. 6 The Court's path to this conclusion has not been straightforward; it has, as Justice Brennan
observed, been a "path... [that] weaves and winds."'
52. For the implausibility of this constitutional argument based on the
available precedents, see Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death
Penaltyand the Constitution,85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1755-58 (1987).
53. Samuel Johnson, Letter to James Boswell (Sept. 19, 1777).
54. Justice William Douglas, the fifth member of the Furman majority,
had left the Court in 1975, the year before Gregg was decided.
55. See Burt, supra note 41, at 1774-79.
56. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Is FairnessIrrelevant? The Evisceration
of FederalHabeasCorpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to
Protect FundamentalRights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1997); Barry Friedman, FailedEnterprise:The Supreme Court'sHabeasReform, 83 CAL. L. REV.
485 (1995).
57. Brennan, supra note 49, at 316.
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Though by 1990 the Court had settled into a consistent
regime of turning aside from any constitutional scrutiny, the
most salient aspect of the Court's jurisprudence for the preceding two decades had been its erratic character. It was as if, for
some unknown reason, the death penalty had suddenly burst
into judicial and general public visibility around 1970, and
though a Court majority tried to avoid this acknowledgment in
McGautha, nagging doubts about the fairness of capital punishment would not disappear; and so the Court did not embrace the issue,58 but rather found itself unable to shake loose
from it for some considerable stretch of time. After its unintelligible eruption in Furman, the Court then settled back to
achieve what it had already announced in McGautha to be
"beyond present human ability"-that is, to rationalize the
the death penalty; and after more "weaving and
application
winding" theof Court
has effectively proclaimed that it has attained this goal and will hold on to this heroic accomplishment
by refusing ever again to look the administration of the death
penalty. The death penalty burst into visibility and, after
much struggle, has now been reburied.
We are, of course, only at the earliest moments of the Supreme Court's attention to assisted suicide; and it may be that,
notwithstanding the odd invitations for future litigation in the
five concurring Justices' opinions, the Court will resist any future engagement and quickly rebury this issue. The experience of the death penalty jurisprudence may indeed serve as an
implicit warning to the Justices against grabbing hold of this
tar baby too. But then again the Justices have many reasons
to share the underlying concerns about the irrationality, indignity, and suffering of death that have become increasingly
vocal in our general public discourse. The Justices may be
tempted, as prior Courts were drawn regarding the death
penalty, to appease this public concern by trying to ameliorate
these evils of death for which the legal system at least might be
held directly responsible.
The sobering lesson of the death penalty jurisprudence is
that the Court has abandoned this effort while refusing to
admit its failure to achieve its much-proclaimed ameliorating
goals. It is not clear whether a more sustained judicial effort

58. The Court acted similarly in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 af-

ter more than a decade of hesitation and equivocation. See BURT, supra note
41, at 271-85.
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could have achieved these goals or whether they are intrinsically inconsistent with the existence of the death penalty.59
Abolition of the death penalty was a possible judicial alternative for vindicating the values of rationality and alleviation of
suffering; but the abolitionist alternative is not even theoretically available to the Justices in addressing the indignities of
death itself. The course actually chosen by the Court regarding
the death penalty is, however, possible-that is, the construction of a patina of rationality and fairness, a pretense maintained by an adamant refusal to attend to actual practices in
implementation. By taking this route for capital punishment,
the Court appeased vocal public concerns and the administration of death was shrouded once again, routinized and bureaucratized in a kind of covertly acknowledged but resolutely
unexamined secrecy. Twenty years from now will we see that
this same path has been followed by a constitutionalized or
otherwise legitimized practice of physician-assisted suicide?
Stay tuned.

59. Justice Harry Blackmun at the end of his tenure on the Court concluded that the rationalizing effort for the death penalty had been "futile." He
had originally dissented in Furman and during the succeeding twenty years
had, as he put it, "endeavored-indeed, I have struggled-along with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend
more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor."
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, he observed, "'RIatherthan continue to coddle the Courtes delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need for
regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to
concede that the death penalty experiment has failed." Id.

